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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. WICKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTIJAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12598 
Brief in Opposition to Appellant's 
Petition and Brief for Rehearing 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT MADE NO MATERIAL ERROR 
ON EITHER THE FACTS OR LAW IN ITS 
OPINION ON POINT III AND AS CLAIMED 
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
Appellant in her brief claims by Point III that the ac-
ceptance of the premium by the defendant insurance company 
after notice of the loss constituted a waiver of the timely 
payment of the premium and thereby claims that coverage 
existed for the death of Mr. Homer Wickes. 
1 
In ruling on this Point III, the court in its opinion stated 
as follows: 
"The third claim of error is that the trial court 
sh?uld have ruled that by the acceptance of the pre-
mmm by the defendant after notice of loss it waived 
the provision of timely payment. 
The premium was not paid within ten days after 
lapse of the policy; hence the policy by its terms was 
not effective until the date when the premium was 
received by the defendant. The 40-day provision of 
the policy governs here, and the policy only became 
effective August 18, 1969, at which time the plaintiff 
and her daughter were the named insureds. The de-
ceased husband was not intended by either plaintiff 
or defendant to be covered by the new policy and, of 
course, plaintiff cannot recover under the new policy 
for his death. 
It is to be regretted that a $10,000 policy was 
not reinstated by the simple expedient of paying a 
$48 premium within the 10-day period following 
termination of the policy. The trial judge, however, 
was under a duty to enforce the policy according to 
its terms, not to make new terms in order to relieve 
the plaintiff from a default." 
This is a sensible, concise ruling on the issue involved 
in Point III. In effect, the court states that it is regrettable 
that the premium was not paid when it should have been, 
but since it was not paid as provided for by the policy, it was 
the trial court's duty to enforce the contract as written. 
Appellant quibbles with a minor error in the factual 
recitation of this part of the court's opinion which has no 
real bearing on the merits. The court does say that the 10-day 
and 40-day notice provisions are actual terms of the policy. 
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Respondent, State Farm, concedes that these are two separate 
notices which are sent to the insured and that they are not 
part of the policy itself. However, this misstatement on the 
part of the court is of no materiality since the court points 
out correctly that the policy only became effective August 
18, 1969 and that "the deceased husband was not intended 
by either plaintiff or defendant to be covered by the new policy 
and, of course, plaintiff cannot recover under the new policy 
for his death." 
Appellant seems to expect some magical significance to 
follow if the court adopts her position that the 10-day and 
40-day notices sent by respondent, State Farm, were not part 
of the policy and argues that this "is the very heart" of appel-
lant's argument. The respondent conceded in its original 
brief and concedes here that they are not part of the policy 
and, hopefully, this should end any further argument on that 
matter. However, this has nothing to do with what the out-
come of this case should be. 
Appellant has conceded, as she must, that the policy ex-
pired on August 1, 1969 and before Homer Wickes' death 
on August 2, 1969, so this ends any right of appellant to re-
cover based on the policy itself. Appellant must also concede 
that whereas State Farm through its 10-day notice and as 
supplemented by the oral message of Agent Starbuck (who 
urged that the premium be paid within the 10 days) was 
willing, in effect, to waive the August 1st expiration date if 
the premium was paid within the 10 days, that such was never 
done and that therefore appellant cannot possibly rely on 
the offer contained in the 10-day notice provision. This brings 
us to what appellant must claim if she is to succeed, this being 
3 
that State Farm somehow waived something after this 10-day 
period by accepting a premium from Mrs. Wickes on August 
18, 1969 and issuing to her a new policy that same day. Ap-
pellant never explains how State Farm's giving Mrs. Wickes 
the very thing she testified she wanted constitutes a waiver of 
its right to receive a timely premium on the old policy and 
prior to its expiration date. Just what Mrs. Wickes testified 
she wanted is set out, with excerpts from her testimony, in 
respondent's original brief (see particularly pages 26 through 
28 of said original brief) and therefore will not be repeated 
here. In essence, what she testified she wanted when she 
mailed in her premium was to have immediate coverage on 
the Oldsmobile she was then driving in Arizona so she would 
not be "uncovered at any time" (Betty Wickes' deposition, 
page 22) , and she also wanted the new policy issued in her 
own name. Her testimony is positive that she did not want 
to be driving this car around in Arizona without insurance. 
State Farm did exactly what she wanted and issued the new 
policy to her with the coverages she had asked for. Just how 
these facts make out a waiver or a "voluntary relinquishment 
of a known right," by State Farm, as would be necessary to 
establish a waiver, has never been explained by appellant. 
All that State Farm did after the original policy of Mr. Wickes 
expired was to try through its 10-day notice and by its agent's 
oral plea to get the premium paid within the 10 days and 
without any lapse in coverage. This having failed, it accepted 
Mrs. Wickes' premium and gave her the coverages and policy 
she demanded starting with the day it got her premium. To 
say that State Farm waived something under the old pclicy 
that had expired by doing this is simply unsupported by logic 
or reason. 
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Appellant in her brief in support of its petition for re-
hearing cites four cases which are claimed to support its waiver 
argument. These are: Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of California, 114 P. 134, 38 Utah 532 (1911); 
Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 64 P. 2d 351, 
91 Utah 405 (1937); Parker v. California State Life Insur-
ance Company, 40 P. 2d 175, 85 Utah 595 ( 1935) and 
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance Company, 232 P. 2d 
754, 120 Utah 109 (1951). The problem with these cases 
is that none are in point under the facts of the instant case 
and this becomes readily apparent upon a reading of them. 
Respondent in its original brief cited its reasons for their 
non-applicability (respondent's original brief, pages 31 through 
39) and the court is referred to that discussion if it deems 
it important. The major distinction between those cases and 
the instant one is that those cases involve a situation 
where an insurance carrier accepted premiums for the period 
prior to and at the time of the loss under a policy that other-
wise would have lapsed for non-payment of the same pre-
miums. In the instant case, respondent, State Farm, never ac-
cepted any premium for the period August 2nd through Aug-
ust 17, 1969 which was the period after the old policy ex-
pired and before the new one was issued. Had State Farm 
accepted the premium for this period, even if it had later re-
funded it, then we would be confronted with the possible 
waiver situation involved in the cases cited in appellant's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy expired on August 1, 1969 and prior to the 
accident and loss which occurred on August 2nd. Appellant 
contends that State Farm or its representatives did something 
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that constituted a waiver of its right under the policy to be 
paid the premium on time. The facts completely fail to sup-
port any such theory of waiver. Respondent, State Farm, did 
offer the appellant the chance for continuous coverage if the 
premium was paid by August 10th. Appellant failed to do 
this and the premium was not received until August 18th. 
On that date, State Farm issued a new policy to appellant and 
immediately commenced the coverage she wanted. No pre-
mium was ever applied or charged to August 2nd or any time 
before August 18th when the premium was received. The 
court made a minor error in its original opinion in indicating 
that the 10-day and 40-day notices were part of the policy, 
but this error is immaterial since the policy had expired be-
fore any premium was paid and no waiver occurred to alter 
the expiration date. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
DAVID K. WINDER 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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